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Sex Post Facto: Advising Clients Regarding
Posthumous Conception
Benjamin C. Carpenter, Minneapolis, Minnesota*

Apart from tax considerations, trust and estate law is often viewed by
outsiders as a somewhat dusty area of the law. However, few examples
better illustrate the intersection of law and technology than posthumous
conception and estate law. While judges, legislators, and commentators
have tackled some of the issues created by posthumous conception, few
estate planning lawyers discuss the issue with their clients. Such hesitance
has been understandable, given the moral sensitivities involved with posthumous conception and the relatively small likelihood that it will affect
any one particular client. However, that likelihood is becoming greater
with each passing year, and, in the context of grandchildren, the possibility of posthumously conceived children is out of the clients’ control.
Rather than ignoring this possibility and leaving the result to chance (or
litigation), lawyers have the opportunity—if not the responsibility—to
raise the issue with their clients and provide them the opportunity to express their intentions. Ultimately, whether to address the issue in an instrument is the client’s choice, but she cannot make this choice if she is not
made aware of the issue. With this Article, estate planning attorneys will
have the background necessary to introduce the topic to clients, to educate
clients about the technology itself, the legal responses to date, and their
various options, and then to draft language to carry out the clients’ intent—whatever it may be.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota. This Article complements a piece in the Winter 2011 issue of the Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy, which analyzed the development of trust and estate
law regarding posthumous conception in much greater detail and provided suggestions
for judges or legislators who tackle the issue. See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the
Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address
the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347
(2011). The prior piece is also a resource for lawyers who may litigate issues regarding
posthumous conception and inheritance. This Article provides a more limited, but more
focused, discussion of these issues for estate planning lawyers who wish to address posthumous conception with their clients on the front end. I thank Professor Kristine
Knaplund, Sonny Miller of Dorsey & Whitney LLP, and Steven Snyder of Steven H.
Snyder & Associates, for their insights and feedback to this Article. The Article is better
for their input, though all opinions expressed in the Article are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court ruled in spring 2012 that
Robert Capato’s twins were not eligible for Social Security survivor benefits,1 major news outlets immediately reported the decision.2 Though
1 See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). The Court, in a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Ginsburg, held that the eligibility of posthumously conceived children for Social Security survivor benefits depends, in part, on whether the children are
“heirs” under the applicable state’s inheritance laws. Id. at 2034. Though the case was at
its heart a statutory interpretation case, the likely result of that ruling was that posthumously conceived twins did not qualify for benefits because they were not heirs of their
deceased father under Florida law. Id. at 2027.
2 See, e.g., Bill Mears, Justices Deny Benefits for Child Conceived After Death of
Parent, CNN, May 21, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-21/justice/justice_scotus-post
humous-conception-ruling_1_survivors-benefits-children-justices?_s=PM:JUSTICE;
Adam Liptak, Children Not Entitled to Dead Father’s Benefits, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/children-not-entitled-to-dead-fath
ers-benefits-justices-rule.html; Jess Bravin, No Benefits for Twins Conceived After Fa-

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2302.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 3

POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION

20-JAN-14

13:46

189

Social Security decisions rarely fascinate a national or even local audience, this case had one irresistible fact: the twins were conceived nine
months after their father’s death. This was, for most Americans, their
introduction to posthumous conception—a concept associated more
with Ray Bradbury than Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
The concept, however, should not be new to estate planning lawyers. Fifty years ago, commentators first warned of the difficulties that
posthumous conception may pose for trust and estate law.3 Twenty
years ago, courts first tackled whether a decedent’s cryopreserved genetic material is property, and if so, who has a right to control that property.4 Similarly, the Capato decision capped a string of ten decisions
from various courts, dating back to 2000, regarding whether posthumously conceived children have an interest in the deceased parent’s estate.5 In the year following Capato, four additional courts have
addressed posthumous conception.6 Sixteen states have passed probate
ther’s Death, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000
1424052702304019404577418062956367588.html.
3 See, e.g., W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and
the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962); Winthrop D. Thies, A Look to the Future:
Property Rights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR. & EST. J. 922 (1971);
Janet J. Berry, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L. REV. 231
(1997).
4 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving
a contest between a decedent’s girlfriend and his children regarding the disposition of his
preserved sperm, which he had devised to his girlfriend in his will); Hall v. Fertility Inst.
of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (involving a contest between a
decedent’s parent and his girlfriend regarding the disposition of his preserved sperm).
Though not a probate case, the first case to address ownership rights in genetic material
was Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992), in which the court held that an
individual’s interest in destroying embryos created during marriage outweighed the former spouse’s interest in donating the embryos to a third party.
5 Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir.
2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011); Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2009); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008); Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007); Stephen v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp.
2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Ariz.
2002), rev’d on other grounds, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Woodward v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2000). See also Hanson v. Astrue, 733 F. Supp. 2d 214 (D. Mass. 2010) (regarding a posthumously conceived child’s right to Social Security survivor benefits, though
not reaching the merits of whether a posthumously conceived child may inherit under
Massachusetts law); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (regarding a posthumously conceived child’s interest in a trust created by grandparents).
6 Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013 WL 3358016 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2013) adopted in rel. part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3357161, No. 10
Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013); In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich.
2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.), 825 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Mich. 2012); Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Neb. 2012); Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
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statutes addressing the interests of posthumously conceived children,
and the Social Security Administration has received more than one hundred applications for survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children.7 Indeed, posthumous conception is no longer science fiction—and
as more couples turn to assisted reproduction for help conceiving children, it will become a reality for more estate planning clients.
Notwithstanding this clear trend, few estate planning lawyers discuss the possibility of posthumous conception with their clients. And
while many commentators have explored the legal and ethical issues
raised by posthumous conception,8 none have offered concrete suggestions for lawyers who have the opportunity to craft their clients’ own
approach to the issue.9 This Article fills that void and provides estate
planning lawyers with the legal and technical background necessary to
discuss the topic with clients, considers the pros and cons of various options available to clients, and proposes specific language for wills, trust
agreements, or other governing instruments.
Importantly, I do not intend to advocate in this Article that any one
approach to posthumous conception is the correct approach, or even
that every estate planning instrument should address the possibility of
posthumous conception. Ultimately, whether—and if so, how—to address the issue in an estate planning document should remain the client’s
decision. However, few clients will raise the issue on their own, and
even fewer will appreciate the many difficulties it creates for an estate
plan (and those ultimately administering that plan). Rather, estate planners should be prepared to initiate a conversation about the possibility
of posthumous conception with their clients, to explain the various issues it may create, to briefly summarize the law on the issue, and—for
those clients who find value in the discussion—to draft appropriate language to carry out the client’s intent. To provide the framework for this
discussion, Part I summarizes the science behind posthumous conception; Part II reviews the legal issues created by posthumous conception
7 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
(No. 11-159).
8 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW & SCIENCE 278-80 (2d ed.
2011), for a bibliography of articles on posthumous conception. See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why
Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 347 (2011), for a comprehensive survey of the law as it stands today (as
updated by this Article), including all model act approaches, and suggestions for future
laws.
9 See Susan N. Gary, Definitions of Children and Descendants: Construing and
Drafting Wills and Trust Documents, 5 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 283 (2013), for an
article providing drafting suggestions generally for definitions of children.
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and the various responses to date; Part III discusses the essential topics
a document must address and the pros and cons of the various options;
and Part IV provides sample language to carry out a client’s preferences. If done well, this conversation provides an opportunity to
demonstrate further to clients the complexity of estate planning, that
there are cutting-edge, non-tax issues in the field, and the expertise and
value you bring to the table. But most importantly, the discussion will
ensure that in the event of posthumous conception, your clients’ intent—not a particular judge’s policies or a statute’s default provisions—
will control the disposition of their property.10
I. THE HISTORY

OF

POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION

The term assisted reproduction, or assisted reproductive technology
(“ART”), includes any method of conceiving a child other than intercourse.11 Although there are numerous variations,12 estate planners

10 For readability, I refer throughout this Article to a will, though the issues raised
apply equally to any estate planning instrument. Similarly, I refer throughout to the decedent as a male and the surviving parent as his partner. These issues are not limited to
male decedents, however, and I intend “partner” to be read broadly to include a spouse
or unmarried partner, whether of the same or opposite sex. Indeed, the issues discussed
in this Article may arise whether the decedent is male or female, gay or heterosexual,
married, engaged, or simply in a committed relationship.
11 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (amended 2002); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-115(2) (amended 2010). Alternatively, in the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, the federal government has defined “assisted reproductive technology” to include only procedures in which a woman’s oocytes are retrieved from her body.
See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1) (2006). That definition is too limited for estate planning purposes, however, because it excludes intrauterine insemination, which, when done with
cryopreserved sperm, can create posthumously conceived children.
12 There are similar techniques in which an egg is fertilized in a laboratory and
transferred to the woman’s fallopian tubes before the zygote becomes an embryo (called
zygote intrafallopian transfer, or ZIFT), or an unfertilized egg and sperm are manually
guided to the woman’s fallopian tubes for fertilization (called gamete intrafallopian transfer, or GIFT). See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES, NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS 3 (2011) [hereinafter 2009 ART REPORT]; KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra
note 8, at 99-100. These techniques, however, account for less than one percent of ART
procedures. See 2009 ART REPORT, supra, at 15. In addition, surrogacy, in which a woman who is not a genetic parent agrees to carry another individual’s child to term, requires the use of IUI or IVF but is not itself a separate ART technique. See generally
KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 151-58. Rather, the term “surrogacy”
refers to the contractual arrangement between the surrogate, who retains no rights or
interests in the child, and the intended parent or parents.
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should be familiar with two primary techniques: intrauterine insemination13 (“IUI”) and in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).
The key difference between these two procedures for estate planning purposes is where (and, as a result, ultimately when) the woman’s
egg is fertilized. With IUI, sperm is placed through artificial means into
a woman’s uterus for fertilization.14 The sperm may come from the woman’s partner or from a third-party (typically anonymous) donor.15
With IVF, the woman’s egg is fertilized outside of her body.16 Specifically, a woman is typically given drugs to stimulate multiple egg production, her eggs are harvested, the eggs are fertilized in a laboratory, the
resulting zygote is grown in a culture for three or more days, and one or
more of the embryos are implanted into the woman’s uterus for gestation.17 With IVF, not only may the sperm come from the woman’s partner or a donor, the egg may also come from a donor.18
Assisted reproduction is not a new practice, though its use has
skyrocketed in recent years. The first documented use of IUI to achieve
a human pregnancy occurred in 1770,19 and the first in the United States
was in 1886.20 The practice did not become common until the 1950s,21
though, and by 1979 almost 10,000 children were being born annually
who were conceived by IUI.22 By 1996, the number jumped to 65,000,23
and it has likely increased since. While IVF is a much newer procedure,
its growth has been even more striking. Since 1978, when the first child

13 Intrauterine insemination is also known as artificial insemination, though most
people now prefer to use “intrauterine” to avoid the negative connotation associated
with “artificial.” See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 40.
14 Id. at 39-40.
15 Id. at 41-42.
16 In vitro is Latin for “in glass.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1419
(5th ed. 2002).
17 See 2009 ART REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in
Reproductive Technology, 318 N. ENGL. J. MED. 828, 829–31 (1988).
18 See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra 7, at 105.
19 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing E.
Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of PostMortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986)).
20 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir From the Freezer, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434 n.4 (2009) (citing Johnson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.
4th 869, 881 (2002)).
21 Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 174 (2007).
22 S.J. Behrman, Artificial Insemination and Public Policy, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED.
619 (1979).
23 Byrn, supra note 21, at 174.
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conceived through IVF was born,24 over 5,000,000 children have been
born worldwide who were conceived through IVF.25
By all signs, the use of ART will only continue to increase. For one,
women on average continue to have children later in life, which increases the likelihood of fertility problems and, thus, reliance on ART.
For instance, from 1970 to 2006, the average age of women at the time
they had their first child increased from 21.4 to 25.0.26 Further, women
are over eight times more likely today than in 1970 to have their first
child after age thirty-four.27 Second, as the technology improves, the
cost of ART continues to decline. Although the cost of an embryo
transfer has not decreased,28 the number of transfers required to
achieve a successful pregnancy has decreased, lowering the overall cost.
For instance, the percent of embryo transfers that resulted in a successful pregnancy increased from five percent in 198829 to thirty-one percent
in 2009.30 In addition, some states now require insurance providers to
cover certain costs related to ART.31 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, as the practice has become more common, the negative stigma
24

Seibel, supra note 17, at 828.
Christian Nordqvist, 5 Millionth IVF Baby Born This Year, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (July 3, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/247343.php.
26 See T.J. MATHEWS & BRADY E. HAMILTON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., DELAYED CHILDBEARING: MORE WOMEN ARE HAVING THEIR FIRST CHILD
LATER IN LIFE 1 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db21.pdf.
27 See id. at 2.
28 In 1988, the average cost for a single cycle of IVF was approximately $6,000. See
Seibel, supra note 17, at 832. In 1994, the average cost for a single cycle increased to
approximately $8,000. Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In
Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 239, 239-41 (1994). In 2005, the average cost
for a single cycle was over $13,000. Mark P. Connolly et al., The Cost and Consequences
of Assisted Reproductive Technology: An Economic Perspective, 16 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 603, 605 (2010); see also Iva Skoch, Should IVF Be Affordable for All?, NEWSWEEK,
Jul. 21, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/07/20/should-ivfbe-affordable-for-all.html (discussing the comparatively high costs of fertility treatments
in the United States).
29 See Byrn, supra note 21, at 174–75.
30 See 2009 ART REPORT, supra note 12, at 65. This number represents the average
for all age groups combined. The success rate for women under age thirty-five is fortyseven percent, while the success rate for women over age forty is only seventeen percent.
See id. at 69. However, the respective success rate for all age groups has increased over
the past ten years. Id.
31 See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 199–204; see also Taun Jain &
Ruchi S. Gupta, Trends in the Use of Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection in the United
States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 251, 255 (2007) (noting the higher use of certain assisted
reproduction techniques in states with mandated insurance coverage for IVF services
than in states without mandated coverage).
25
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once associated with ART has largely disappeared, making more individuals willing to try ART.32
The above, however, is only half the story. Intrauterine insemination and IVF do not by themselves explain how posthumous conception
is possible. In fact, it was not possible until 1949, when scientists discovered that human sperm will retain its viability once frozen and thawed if
glycerol is used in the freezing process.33 Thus was born genetic cryopreservation—the ability to freeze human genetic material and thaw it
at a later date for reproduction. Only four years later, the first child was
born who was conceived from frozen sperm,34 and in 2004 a child was
born who was conceived from sperm that had been frozen for twentyone years.35 Today, it is a common practice for young men who face the
possibility of becoming sterile, such as soldiers or cancer patients, to
freeze sperm to preserve the opportunity to have genetic children down
the road.36

32

See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 15–21.
See Eric M. Walters et al., The History of Sperm Cryopreservation, in SPERM
BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 4, 6 (Allan A. Pacey & Matthew J. Tomlinson eds.,
2009). Technically, posthumous conception is possible without cryopreservation through
the controversial practice of postmortem sperm retrieval, in which sperm are retrieved
from a male’s body shortly after his death. In two published cases, a surviving wife had
sperm retrieved from her husband’s body shortly after his unexpected death and used the
sperm to become pregnant. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Stephen v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that the
husband died of a heart attack). However, unless a pregnancy occurs (either through IUI
of IVF) almost immediately after the sperm are retrieved, cryopreservation would be
required in that scenario as well. The sample clause provided in this Article covers the
possibility that a posthumously conceived child may be conceived after postmortem
sperm retrieval (with or without the use of cryopreservation). See infra Parts III.C.1. and
IV.C. For more on postmortem sperm retrieval, see generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of Gametes from Deceased or Incompetent Persons, J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L., VII: 147 (2011); Mary F. Radford, Postmortem
Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security Administration: How Modern Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 33 (2009).
34 Mark S. Frankel, Cryobanking of Human Sperm, 1 J. MED. ETHICS 36 (1975)
(citing R.G. Bunge & J.K. Sherman, Fertilizing Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatozoa,
172 NATURE 767, 767–68 (1953)).
35 See Walters et al., supra note 33, at 10; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable: Legal Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34
ACTEC J. 154, 155 (2008) (citing Baby Born from Frozen Sperm for Record 21 Years,
OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS WEEK, Jun. 19, 2004, at 59).
36 See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2004) [hereinafter Knaplund, Postmortem Conception]; Kindregan, Jr., supra note 20, at 436.
33
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Likewise, women can freeze their eggs for future use.37 The first
child conceived from a frozen egg was born in 1986.38 Although the
success rate using thawed eggs was very low initially, it has increased
over the past decade.39 In 2007, 138 assisted reproduction clinics reported that they freeze human eggs—twice the number from 2004.40
As the use of IVF has skyrocketed, so has the practice of freezing
embryos. In 1984, the first child was born who developed from a frozen
embryo.41 Eighteen years later, researchers surveyed United States
clinics to determine the number of existing frozen embryos.42 The researchers estimated that the number could be as low as 30,000, and that
most frozen embryos would be designated for research.43 Instead, they
learned that in 2002, 396,526 frozen embryos existed, 88.2% of which
were designated for reproduction.44 Undoubtedly, the number of frozen embryos is much greater a decade later, as couples undergoing IVF
commonly freeze extra embryos for later potential use.45
This does not mean, of course, that each sperm sample, frozen egg,
or frozen embryo has a deceased parent. Presumably, relatively few
couples preserve their genetic material specifically for posthumous conception. Rather, most do so to use together at a later date, but one of
them dies prematurely. If the survivor wishes to have a (or another)
child, she must decide whether to commit to a new partner, use a sperm
donor, or use the sperm or embryos she had preserved with her deceased partner. Some choose the latter because they are not ready to
commit to a new partner (and may be nearing the end of their reproductive life), some do it to honor their deceased partner, and some do it to
37

Byrn, supra note 21, at 174 n.43.
Id.
39 See Filippo Ubaldi et al., Cumulative Ongoing Pregnancy Rate Achieved with Oocyte Vitrification and Cleavage Stage Transfer Without Embryo Selection in a Standard
Infertility Program, 25 HUM. REPROD. 1199, 1199-1200 (2010).
40 Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech
Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. J. 393, 396 n.11 (citing Rob Stein,
Women Hedge Bets by Banking Their Oocytes, WASHINGTON POST, May 13, 2007, at A1)
[hereinafter Knaplund, Legal Issues].
41 U.B. Wennerholm et al., Children Born After Cryopreservation of Embryos or
Oocytes: A Systematic Review of Outcome Data, 24 HUM. REPROD. 2158 (2009).
42 David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their
Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066-68 (2003).
43 Id. at 1068.
44 Id.
45 Preserving excess embryos is more economical and efficient than harvesting and
fertilizing eggs for each IVF cycle. See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at
101. As it is, frozen embryos are used in over 30,000 IVF cycles performed each year.
See 2009 ART REPORT, supra note 12, at 16.
38
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know the genetic identity of their child.46 Indeed, relatively few of the
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of sperm samples, eggs, and embryos frozen today will mature into a posthumously conceived child.
However, each sample or embryo is only an accident or bad diagnosis
away from having a deceased parent and, if the surviving partner
chooses, from becoming a posthumously conceived child. And no one
can predict, of course, which of those scenarios may involve his or her
own client.
So, how many posthumously conceived children have been born to
date? That number is not known, but fourteen published opinions address the interests of posthumously conceived children,47 and as of 2011
the Social Security Administration had received more than 100 applications for survivor benefits by posthumously conceived children.48 While
not substantial, the number certainly is not insignificant. In all likelihood, the actual number is much larger. The Social Security Administration has noted that the rate of benefit applications by posthumously
conceived children has “increased significantly” in recent years,49 and
not all such children will apply for survivor benefits.50 In any event, as
the number of individuals who rely on ART and cryopreservation continues to increase, so will the number of posthumously conceived children. And, as illustrated next, it may be the document your client
executes today that controls the interests of a child conceived years
down the road.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
(FOR ESTATE PLANNING)
Posthumous conception has created many unforeseen questions in
estate law. While a number of jurisdictions have addressed some of
these issues, the majority have not. And even in the jurisdictions that
have, many questions remain. Estate planners must understand these
issues and their respective jurisdiction’s response, if any, for three rea46 Obviously, there may be more than one reason a person would choose to use a
deceased partner’s genetic material, and the reasons are often more complex than those
presented above. See Knaplund, Legal Issues, supra note 40 at 398-401, for a more complete discussion of these and other considerations.
47 See supra notes 5 & 6. In addition, other courts have addressed whether a survivor has a right to a deceased partner’s genetic material. See supra note 4.
48 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
(No. 11-159).
49 Id.
50 As recently confirmed by the United States Supreme Court, posthumously conceived children are not eligible for survivor benefits if they are not deemed “heirs” under
the applicable state’s intestacy law. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021. The states falling in this
category are summarized infra Part II.B.
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sons. First, estate planners must articulate (at least a few of) these issues for their clients to help the clients understand how the topic may
apply to them. Second, estate planners must be able to explain the law,
if any, in the applicable jurisdiction to determine whether it is consistent
with their clients’ desires. Finally, estate planners must understand the
breadth of the issues created by posthumous conception in order to
draft language that resolves them without unintended vagueness or ambiguity. Accordingly, this section summarizes the main issues created by
posthumous conception, then reviews the various legal responses to
date.
A. Legal Issues Created by Posthumous Conception
Courts, legislatures, and commentators have focused primarily on
the circumstances, if any, under which a posthumously conceived child
should be entitled to inherit from the deceased parent.51 Because this
article is intended for lawyers who advise clients on the front end and
thus avoid intestacy, I will explore instead the issues created by posthumously conceived children in the context of class-gift provisions for children, grandchildren, descendants, issue, or the like.52
To put this into context, consider the following hypothetical. A
married couple in their thirties has a daughter, Anna, through IVF.
During that process, they freeze a number of embryos for later potential
use.53 After they have Anna, they create reciprocal wills. Because they
are young and recognize that if either dies the survivor may remarry,
each provides that a portion of his or her assets shall be held in trust for
their “issue,” and the balance shall be distributed to the surviving
51 For a thorough analysis of every decision and statute (including all model approaches and state statutes) to date, see Carpenter, supra note 8, at 359-404.
52 In 2011 trustees filed fiduciary tax returns for almost 2.6 million existing trusts.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI Tax Stats - Fiduciary Returns - Sources of Income,
Deductions, and Tax Liability - Type of Entity, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Fidu
ciary-Returns-Sources-of-Income-Deductions-and-Tax-Liability-by-Type-of-Entity (follow “2011” hyperlink). (Oct. 2012) (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). This included complex
trusts (1,334,094), simple trusts (691,867), and grantor trusts (561,139). Id. Because not
all grantor trusts file tax returns, however, the actual number of trusts is somewhat
higher. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI Tax Stats - Income from Trusts and Estates Study Data Sources and Limitations, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats—-In
come-from-Trusts-and-Estates-Study-Data-Sources-and-Limitations (last updated May 2,
2013) (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). In addition, there are undoubtedly a similar number of
(if not many more) testamentary trusts contemplated by wills or revocable trust agreements that have not yet taken effect. Presumably, a large majority of such documents
have present or contingent provisions for grandchildren, issue, heirs, descendants, or similar class designations.
53 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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spouse. So far, most readers can likely identify a number of clients who
fit the above description.54
A year or two later, however, the husband dies unexpectedly. The
trust under his will is established for his “issue,” and the balance of his
estate is distributed to his wife. After a period of mourning, his wife
decides she wants another child, a sibling for Anna. However, she is in
her late thirties now and has not begun a new relationship. Accordingly,
she uses the frozen embryos she and her husband had created to have a
second child, John. Is John a trust beneficiary? Should it matter
whether John is born within a year of his father’s death? Two years?
Ten years? Should it matter whether the husband had authorized his
wife to use the embryos after his death? If so, must such authorization
be in writing? Should it matter that the couple was married? If the wife
remarries, should that cut off John’s interests, as though he had been
adopted? Alternatively, if the will named Anna specifically, should
John be deemed a pretermitted heir?55
Now consider instruments created by the husband’s parents. If at
Anna’s birth they had created a long-term trust for their grandchildren,
would John be a beneficiary of that trust? Similarly, assume the husband’s parents are still living and their wills provide for their “issue per
stirpes;” when they die, will just Anna be deemed their “issue,” or
would John as well?
The prior paragraph illustrates a critical point for advising clients.
The issues created by posthumous conception are not limited to situations in which the client has a child who is conceived after the client’s
death. Rather, anytime a client’s document provides that assets could
become distributable to grandchildren, issue, or descendants, these
problems could arise if either the client or the client’s child conceives
posthumously. Even if the clients themselves have not frozen genetic
material, their children may have or may do so in the future—and possibly without the clients’ knowledge. Indeed, whether your clients’ child
may have a posthumously conceived child will be altogether out of the
clients’ control. Although a posthumously conceived child or grandchild
may not arise until many years—or even decades—down the road, it
may be the document you are drafting today that will determine that
child’s interests. In sum, this conversation pertains to any client—young
54 Most lawyers, however, may not know whether a client used IVF to have a child,
because neither the lawyer nor the clients considered it relevant. However, with over
5,000,000 children born who were conceived through IVF, see supra note 25, the likelihood is great that a number of our estate planning clients have used IVF. Alternatively,
this scenario could also arise if the husband simply froze his sperm.
55 Pretermitted-heir statutes provide generally that a child born after his or her parent executed a will shall have an interest in that parent’s estate, unless the parent expressly omitted the future child. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010).
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or old, married or single, same-sex or heterosexual—who (1) has preserved genetic material, (2) may do so in the future, or (3) is including in
her documents a provision for grandchildren, issue, or descendants,
whether the interest is outright or in trust, vested or contingent.56
In addition, careful planners must consider not only the interests of
posthumously conceived children, but the implications for fiduciaries
and other beneficiaries. If a fiduciary distributes assets from a trust or
estate, and a posthumously conceived child is later born, should the fiduciary face liability for distributing assets prematurely? Should it matter whether the fiduciary knew that the decedent had preserved genetic
material? If so, who should be responsible for providing that notice?
Should the surviving partner have an affirmative duty to notify the fiduciary, or should the fiduciary be required to inquire about the existence
of frozen genetic material before distributing assets? Similarly, should
transferees be required to return assets they had received before the
birth of a posthumously conceived child? Should it matter whether or
not they have spent or retained the assets received?
Finally, even if a client’s will addresses all of the above scenarios,
additional issues may still exist. For instance, instructions or statements
of intent in a will, however forceful and unambiguous, will not control
nonprobate assets governed by beneficiary designations, primarily life
insurance proceeds and retirement account benefits. Custodians generally have authority to establish their own rules regarding the distribution
of assets, and they are not bound by state laws regarding posthumous
conception.57 While a client may attempt to address the issue in an attachment to a beneficiary designation, few custodians or plan administrators are likely to accept novel language regarding posthumous
56 An instructive example of a client not being properly advised to address future
possibilities is found in In re Rick’s Trust, 176 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1961), in which a settlor
inadvertently failed to include adopted children as eligible trust beneficiaries under earlier law. In an affidavit, the settlor had stated, “I assumed that an adopted child was
considered to be the same as a natural child. If there had been adopted children in 1950
or if any problem had arisen at that time I would have instructed my attorney to use
whatever language was necessary to include adopted children.” Id. at 728. The settlor
added, “Since there were no adopted children in 1950 and no such problem was
presented, I did not so instruct my attorney, but it was not my intention to exclude
adopted children[.]” Id.; see also Gary, supra note 9, at 319 (highlighting this case).
57 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (2006) (“[T]he provisions . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan[.]”). Though I am not aware of
any custodians who have addressed posthumous conception in their plan documents,
most will likely opt to maximize their own efficiency and minimize risk—and thus simply
not recognize provisions regarding posthumously conceived children. Specifically, custodians and administrators will likely provide in their documents that all beneficiaries must
be born at the time of (or, possibly, within nine months after) the participant’s death.
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conception.58 Moreover, certain benefits, such as Social Security survivor benefits, may or may not be available to posthumously conceived
children based solely on each state’s intestacy law.59 Though you may
not be able to resolve these issues through drafting, you must understand these issues to advise fully your client.
B. Legal Reponses to Posthumous Conception
As noted above, the majority of the cases and statutes that address
posthumous conception regard inheritance—only a few establish rules
of construction regarding class-gift provisions. Overall, as of October 1,
2013, twenty-two states have addressed what interests, if any, posthumously conceived children may have as heirs or class members—and the
approaches are split down the middle. Twelve states provide that posthumously conceived children will not be deemed heirs of the deceased
parent under any circumstance,60 while ten states recognize posthumously conceived children as heirs, based on various conditions.61 Further, four of the states with statutes excluding posthumously conceived
children for inheritance purposes expressly exclude them for class-gift
purposes as well, while four of the states that include posthumously conceived expressly include them for class gift purposes. The other fourteen states’ statutes are silent regarding class-gifts, creating uncertainty
in this aspect. New York is the only state that takes both approaches—
while its legislature has provided that posthumously conceived children
have no interests under intestacy or as a pretermitted heir,62 a court has
recognized posthumously conceived children for class-gift purposes.63

58 The solution may be to direct the assets to the client’s estate, though that must be
weighed against other factors, such as the potential loss of creditor protection and, for
retirement assets, less favorable pay-out options.
59 Social Security Act § 216(h)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006); see also Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). Similarly, wrongful death proceeds and workers’
compensation benefits may or may not be available to posthumously conceived children,
based on each state’s statutory definitions of “heir” or “dependent.” Cf. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2009).
60 See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
62 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(c) (inheritance), § 5-3.2(b) (pretermitted heirs) (McKinney 2013); see also Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013
WL 3358016 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) adopted in rel. part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin,
2013 WL 3357161, No. 10 Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (definition of child for inheritance); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (pretermitted heirs).
63 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 211.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2302.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 15

POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION

20-JAN-14

13:46

201

The twelve states that exclude posthumously conceived children for
inheritance purposes are Arkansas,64 Georgia,65 Idaho,66 Michigan,67
Minnesota,68 Nebraska,69 New Hampshire,70 New York,71 South Carolina,72 South Dakota,73 Virginia,74 and Washington.75 Among these
states, though, the law is not always clear whether the exclusion applies
to class-gifts, as well. Only Minnesota, South Dakota, Virginia, and
Washington expressly exclude posthumously conceived children for
both intestacy and class-gift purposes.76 In Arkansas, Michigan, Nebraska, and New Hampshire, the rule comes from case law, and the issue before the court was limited to whether a posthumously conceived
64

Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Ark. 2008).
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2013) (relevant language added by 1996 Ga.
Laws 529).
66 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (2013) (relevant language added by 2005 Idaho
Sess. Laws 123).
67 In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec.).
68 MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(10) (2013) (relevant language added by 2010 Minn.
Laws 1007).
69 Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Neb. 2012). Notably, a bill was introduced
in 2013 to amend Nebraska’s probate code to include posthumously conceived children
under certain circumstances. See Legis. B. 134, 103rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013).
70 Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007).
71 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1(c); 5-3.2 (McKinney 2013); Bosco ex
rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013 WL 3358016 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) adopted
in rel. part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3357161, No. 10 Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y.
July 3, 2013); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (Sur. Ct. 2007).
72 S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2012) (relevant language added by 1990 S.C. Acts
2279).
73 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (Supp. 2012) (relevant language added by 2007
S.D. Sess. Laws 413).
74 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-164, 64.2-204 (2013) (effective since 1994). See also
Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q.
579, 590 (2005) (explaining conflicts and inconsistencies in Virginia’s statutes relating to
posthumous reproduction).
75 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (2013). Although the statute merely uses the
“conceived before” language discussed infra, the language, adopted in 2007, replaced a
general “posthumous heirs” reference, and the legislative history indicates the legislature’s intent was to preclude posthumously conceived children. See Final Summary of
Legislation & Budgets Passed by the Washington State Legislature, S. Doc. No. 2236, at I74 (2007), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/House/Committees/Documents/Archive/
sinedie2007.pdf.
76 MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-705, 524.2 -708 (2013) (incorporating the intestate succession rules into class gifts); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-2-705, -708 (2013); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-164, 64.2-204 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (2013) (excluding
posthumously conceived children from the definition of “issue” for all purposes under
the probate and trust code).
65
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child may be an heir.77 Thus, the courts did not address how it would
interpret a class-gift designation in a will or trust agreement. Notably,
three of those four courts urged its respective legislature to address all
issues raised by posthumous conception in a thoughtful, comprehensive
manner,78 but none have done so. The Georgia, Idaho, and South Carolina statutes provide that posthumously conceived children may not inherit, but they are silent regarding class-gifts.79 Courts in these three
states still may recognize such children in the class-gift context, as the
New York court did, or they may not.
The ten states that recognize posthumously conceived children
for inheritance purposes are California,80 Colorado,81 Florida,82
Iowa,83 Louisiana,84 Maryland,85 Massachusetts,86 New Jersey,87 New
77 See Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008); In re Cert. Ques. W.D.
Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.); Amen v. Astrue,
822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Neb. 2012); Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d
1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007).
78 Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 854-55; In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566, 57172 (Mattison v. Comm’r Soc. Sec) (Cavanagh, J., concurring); Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1187
(Broderick, C.J., concurring).
79 See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2013); Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman,
Georgia’s New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 621 (1997) (explaining that the
legislative purpose behind the limitation was to provide for the efficient administration of
estates); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (2013); 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 123 (Statement of
Purpose); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2012).
80 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5–249.8 (West 2013). These provisions became effective
January 1, 2005. See Assemb. B. 1910, 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 775 (Cal. 2004).
81 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-120, -121 (2013). These provisions became effective
July 1, 2010. See H.B. 09-1287, 2009 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 310 (Colo. 2009).
82 FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2013). This provision became effective June 30, 1993. See
Act of May 15, 1993, ch. 93-237, 1993 Fla. Laws 2405.
83 IOWA CODE § 633.220 (2013) (governing intestacy), § 633.267(2) (governing
pretermitted heirs under a will), § 633A.3106(2) (governing pretermitted heirs under a
trust agreement). These provisions became effective March 31, 2011. See H.F. 245, 2011
Ia. Legis. Serv. Ch. 18 (Ia. 2011).
84 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2013). This provision became effective June
21, 2001. See S.B. 494, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2001).
85 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2013). This provision became effective October 1, 2012. See 2012 Md. Laws 649, amended by 2013 Md. Laws 644.
86 See Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). Notably, the
Massachusetts legislature subsequently adopted the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, effective July 1, 2011. See 2008 Mass. Acts 521. Although the significance of the statutory
change is unclear, see infra notes 125 to 126 and accompanying text, Woodward likely has
little remaining precedential value.
87 See In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). Notably, although the New Jersey Superior Court held that the posthumously conceived children
may be heirs under the 1969 UPC, it was a trial court decision and the New Jersey legislature subsequently revised the statute’s language from that found in the 1969 UPC (“conceived before”) to that in the 1990 UPC (“in gestation”), 2004 N.J. Laws 1442 (effective
Feb. 27, 2005). Although the significance of the statutory change is unclear, see infra
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Mexico,88 and North Dakota.89 Among these states, however, the laws
vary greatly and are often unclear. In New Jersey, a Superior Court
judge held that a posthumously conceived child may inherit from the
deceased parent if it would not “unfairly intrude on the rights of the
other persons” or “cause serious problems in terms of the orderly administration of estates.”90 What would unfairly intrude on another’s
rights or constitute a serious problem is fact-specific analysis, though,
that requires a case-by-case determination.91 Similarly, Massachusetts’
highest court held that a posthumously conceived child may inherit from
the deceased parent if specific elements are met, including that time limitations do not bar the claim.92 It did not specify what such time limitations are, however, leaving it again to a case-by-case analysis. Neither of
these cases addressed class-gifts.
In Florida, a posthumously conceived child may bring “a claim
against the decedent’s estate,” but only if the decedent provided for the
child in the decedent’s will.93 This provision is in Florida’s parentage
statutes, though, not its probate statutes, and it does not clarify what
type of “claim” the child may bring, or by when the child must bring it.
In Iowa and Maryland, the child must be born within two years of the
decedent’s death to inherit;94 in California, the child must be “in utero”
within two years of the decedent’s death;95 in Louisiana, the child must
be born within three years of the decedent’s death;96 and in Colorado,
New Mexico, and North Dakota, the child must be “in utero not later
than thirty-six months after the individual’s death[, or b]orn not later
than forty-five months after the individual’s death.”97
notes 125 to 126 and accompanying text, Kolacy likely has little remaining precedential
value.
88 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-120, -121 (2013). These provisions became effective
January 1, 2012. See 2011 N.M. Laws 124.
89 N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (2013). This provision became effective August 1,
2009. See 2009 N.D. Laws 283.
90 Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
91 For the reasons stated supra note 87, this decision likely has little remaining force
in New Jersey.
92 Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); but see supra
note 86 regarding the precedential value of Woodward.
93 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (2013).
94 IOWA CODE § 633.220A (2013); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2013).
95 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (West 2013).
96 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2012) (Louisiana’s statute originally included
a two-year limitation, 2001 La. Acts 1044, but the legislature later extended the deadline
to three years, 2003 La. Acts 1918).
97 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-120(c)(11), -121 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2120(K), -121 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19(11) (2013). These statutes mirror the
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The differences do not end there. The Iowa and Louisiana statutes
recognize posthumously conceived children only if the decedent was
married at the time of death,98 while the California, Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Dakota statutes do not require that the
parents were married.99 Likewise, while each of these ten states requires some form of consent from the decedent in order for the child to
be deemed his own, the extent of the consent varies among the states.
California, Iowa, and Louisiana only require that the decedent had consented to the surviving partner’s posthumous use of the genetic material;100 Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Dakota require
that the decedent had consented to “be treated as a parent;”101 and
Massachusetts requires that the decedent had consented “to support”
the child.102 Finally, only the California, Colorado, New Mexico, and
North Dakota statutes expressly recognize posthumously conceived children in class-gift scenarios;103 the other states’ statutes refer only to
inheritance.
Five additional states have adopted (in various forms) the 2000
changes to the Uniform Parentage Act, which recognize a parent-child
relationship between a decedent and posthumously conceived child, but
only if the decedent had consented “in a record” to “be a parent of the
child.”104 These states are Alabama, Delaware, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming.105 It is unclear whether courts in these states will apply this language in the probate context, though. It is a parentage act, not a
probate act. While the 1969 Uniform Probate Code recognized (by specific reference) any parent-child relationship established under the Unilimitations suggested in 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (amended 2010).
98 IOWA CODE § 633.220A; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) cmt.
99 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5–249.8; COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120, -121; MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2-120, -121; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-04-19.
100 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a); IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1)(b) (2013); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A).
101 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(III); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3107(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120(F)(2)(c); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-04-19(6)(b).
102 Woodward v. Comm’r, 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); but see supra note 86
regarding the precedential value of Woodward.
103 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5, 21114 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. 15-11-705
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-705 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-05 (2013).
104 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
105 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2013); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis
2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2013).
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form Parentage Act,106 that language was added thirty years before the
Uniform Parentage Act’s 2000 amendments.
Moreover, if the Commissioners intended to create a simple solution to the complex probate issues caused by posthumous conception, by
way of a single sentence in a parentage act, its efforts were misplaced.
For one, the Uniform Parentage Act includes no time limitation before
which the child must be born to be recognized as the decedent’s child,
making it essentially unworkable in the context of estate or trust administration. Moreover, the comment to section 707 provides that the language was intended “to avoid the problems of intestate succession which
could arise” from the posthumous use of a decedent’s genetic material,
and that “[a spouse] who wants to explicitly provide for such children in
his or her will may do so.”107 Thus, the Commissioners seemingly intended to establish a rule that generally precluded posthumously conceived children from inheriting assets, while recognizing that an
individual could avoid this result by providing otherwise in “a record”—
namely, a will.108
But even if the Commissioners intended Section 707 of the Uniform
Parentage Act to apply broadly in the probate context, it remains unclear whether courts in these five states will hold that each state’s legislature intended this. For instance, unlike the 1969 Uniform Probate
Code, the Alabama, Delaware, and Wyoming probate codes do not refer to their respective parentage acts regarding a parent-child relationship.109 In sum, a court may apply this language or it may not. Until a
court or legislature in each of these states clarifies this, we simply do not
know the answer.110 Rather, the issue should be addressed in its proper
106

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1969).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 cmt. (amended 2002).
108 For a more thorough analysis of whether § 707 of the 2000 Uniform Parentage
Act applies in the probate context, see Carpenter, supra note 8, at 368-72.
109 See ALA. CODE § 43-8-48; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 41(a) (West 2013); contra UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107.
Notably, Alabama, Texas, and Utah only recognize a parent-child relationship between a
posthumously conceived child and the deceased parent if the parents were married at the
time of the decedent’s death. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-707; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.707; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-707. Also, Alabama and Texas require that a licensed physician maintain “the record” of the decedent’s intent. See ALA. CODE § 26-17707; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707.
110 In late 2012, the Utah Supreme Court answered the certified question, “Is a
signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor’s wife in the event of his death
sufficient to constitute ‘consent[ ] in a record’ to being the ‘parent’ of a child conceived
by artificial means after the donor’s death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-15-707.” Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012). Notably, the question
presumes that a parent-child relationship established under this section of the parentage
act would apply for intestacy purposes. That issue was not certified to the Utah Supreme
Court however, and the Utah Supreme Court narrowly answered the certified question
107
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context—the probate code itself—as the Commissioners did in the 2008
amendments to the Uniform Probate Code.111
Finally, the remaining twenty-four jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) have not explicitly addressed what interests, if any,
posthumously conceived children may have for inheritance or class-gift
purposes. However, each of these jurisdictions has a “posthumous
heirs” or “afterborn heirs” provision that ostensibly covers posthumous
conception. For instance, the 1946 Model Probate Code (the first model
or uniform probate act) provided that “[d]escendants . . . of the intestate, begotten before his death but born thereafter, shall inherit as if
they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived
him.”112 Similarly, the 1969 Uniform Probate Code provided, “Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.”113
In this context, as well, it is unclear whether (and if so, how) courts
would apply such language to posthumously conceived children. For
one, this language simply codifies a rule that goes back thousands of
years to the ancient Romans.114 Even in 1946, when the Model Probate
Code was promulgated, genetic cryopreservation—and, thus, posthumous conception—was still science fiction.115 By 1969, cryopreservation
of sperm was possible, but the technique was rather limited116 and still
considered experimental.117 Not until 1984 was the first embryo sucexactly as it was presented, holding that “without more, a Semen Storage Agreement that
leaves frozen sperm to the donor’s wife upon his death does not constitute sufficient
consent in a record to be the parent of a child conceived by artificial means following the
donor’s death.” Id. at 555. In other words, the court simply considered who would be a
parent under the parentage act. And while the court neither confirmed nor questioned
whether such a person would be deemed a parent for inheritance purposes, it did note in
a footnote that the Utah Code defines “parent” separately from the parentage act for
probate purposes. Id. at 555 n.9 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(33) (LexisNexis
2013)). In sum, while it appears likely (perhaps very likely) that a posthumously conceived child could inherit from the deceased parent under Utah law, that question has not
been directly addressed.
111 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (amended 2008).
112 MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 (1946), located in MICH. LEGAL STUD., PROBLEMS
IN PROBATE LAW 10 (1946) (prepared by by the Model Probate Committee for the Division of the Real Propery, Probate, and Trust Law of the American Bar Association).
113 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969). As discussed infra, in 1990 the Commissioners revised Section 2-108 to provide “An individual in gestation at a particular time is
treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours of more after birth.” Id.
(amended 1990).
114 See Knaplund, Postmortem Conception, supra note 36, at 107-08.
115 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
116 See Walters, supra note 34, at 4 (noting that prior to 1964, all pregnancies were
produced from short-term storage of sperm).
117 See Frankel, supra 35, at 36.
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cessfully frozen and thawed for implantation.118 Should a court strictly
construe a statute when it is almost certain that the drafters did not contemplate the facts before the court? In this very context, a few courts
have done so,119 while others have not.120
Furthermore, if a court strictly applies such clauses, subtle, unintended differences among the states would lead to vastly different results. Some statutes refer simply to “posthumous children,” which, read
strictly, would include posthumously conceived children.121 Others refer to children “in gestation” at the decedent’s death, which would exclude posthumously conceived children.122 And for those states that
still incorporate the 1946 Model Probate Code or 1969 Uniform Probate
Code language (begotten/conceived before his death but born thereafter), the terms “begotten” and “conceived” would create significant difficulties. In the ART context, does “conception” occur at fertilization of
the egg or implantation of that fertilized egg in a woman’s uterus?123
The question highlights the difference between IVF and IUI. If
conception is defined as the moment of fertilization, then children con118

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec.) (applying the 1969 Uniform Probate Code’s posthumous heirs clause literally
to posthumous conceived children); Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Neb. 2012)
(same regarding the 1990 Uniform Probate Code); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th
Cir. 2011) (applying the 1969 Uniform Probate Code’s posthumous heirs clause literally
to posthumously conceived children); Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 854–55 (Ark.
2008) (same regarding language almost identical to the 1969 Uniform Probate Code);
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (same regarding the
1990 Uniform Probate Code). For a detailed discussion of each of the pre-2012 cases, see
Carpenter, supra note 8, at 383-401.
120 Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002) (refusing to
apply the clause “[p]osthumous children shall be considered as living at the death of their
parent” literally in the context of posthumously conceived children); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (refusing to apply the 1969
Uniform Probate Code’s posthumous heirs clause literally to posthumously conceived
children. The court looked to the legislative treatment of the Parentage Act of New
Jersey and said that the legislature never specifically dealt with posthumous conception).
121 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 132.290 (2011) (“A posthumous child is deemed living at the death of his or her parent.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (2013) (“Posthumous
children are considered living at the death of their parents.”).
122 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (2013) (“An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time[.]”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (2013)
(same).
123 The only case to address the definition of conception head-on in this context is
Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013 WL 3358016, at *9-12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2013), adopted in relevant part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3357161, No.
10 Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013), in which a magistrate judge interpreted “conception” as used in New York’s probate statutes and held that conception occurs upon implantation of the zygote or embryo in a woman’s uterus.
119
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ceived through IVF during their father’s life would be included under
such clauses—even if not implanted until years after his death. However, children conceived through IUI after the father’s death would
never be included.124 Alternatively, if conception is defined as implantation, then posthumously conceived children would never be included
under such clauses, whether IVF or IUI is used. While each reader may
have her own understanding of conception, shaped by her faith or experiences, the answer for statutory interpretation purposes, of course, is
what the legislature intended it to mean. But again, the legislatures simply were not considering such facts when they drafted these provisions.
Notably, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws changed “conceived” to “in gestation” in the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code.125 Because cryopreservation had become widely practiced by 1990, the Commissioners likely changed the language to resolve
the distinction between IUI and IVF and, in effect, exclude all posthumously conceived children. However, the Commissioners did not explain this change in a comment, they did not make the provision
exclusive (i.e., only children conceived before the death), and some
commentators, including the authors of the Restatement (Third) of
Property, Wills and Other Donative Transfers, assert that the clause does
not preclude posthumously conceived children.126 In any event, even in
those states that have adopted the 1990 Uniform Probate Code,127 it is
the intent of the respective legislature, not the Commissioners, that controls. Once again, until a court or legislature expressly addresses this,
we simply cannot advise our clients with certainty what interests posthumously conceived children may have in such states.
In summary, twenty-nine jurisdictions have not yet expressly addressed posthumous conception in the probate context, and the law is
not entirely clear in many of the states that have. The foregoing is summarized below in Table 1. Even if the law becomes absolutely clear in
124 With IVF, fertilization occurs before death and embryos are frozen; with IUI,
sperm alone is frozen before death and fertilization occurs after death. See generally
supra Part I.
125 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (amended 1990).
126 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5
cmt. l (2012) (“Most statutory codifications, including enactments of the Original or Revised Uniform Probate Code . . . do not preclude inheritance by a child conceived after
the decedent’s death. They merely provide that a child who is in gestation at the decedent’s death is treated as then living.”).
127 These states include Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, Vermont, and West Virginia. In addition, New Jersey has also adopted much of the 1990 UPC, but the continuing effect of Kolacy remains unclear. See supra note 87. Finally, Michigan has adopted
this language, though the Michigan Supreme Court recently held that it does not include
posthumously conceived children. In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich.
2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.).
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every state, though, this is helpful only if the law accurately reflects the
wishes of your client. And even then, laws can change, clients may
move to a new state, or a trustee may move a trust’s situs to a new state.
Thus, the only way to ensure that your client’s wishes will be carried out
is to address the issue with your clients, determine their intent, then
draft accordingly.
TABLE 1: State Approaches to Posthumously Conceived Children for
Inheritance and Class-Gift Purposes128
Inheritance

Class-Gift

Includes Excludes Includes Excludes
✓

Arkansas129
California130

✓

✓

Colorado131

✓

✓

Florida132

✓

Georgia133

✓

Idaho134

✓

Iowa135

✓

Louisiana136

✓

Maryland137

✓

Massachusetts138

✓

128 States not shown in Table 1 have statutory provisions that appear on their face to
address posthumous conception. However, for the reasons explained infra, and in
greater detail in Carpenter, supra note 8, at 359-401, it remains unclear how the language
will be applied to posthumous conception until a court construes each statute or the
legislatures revise the language. In addition, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
recently addressed a related issue and, while it appears likely that Utah may recognize
posthumously conceived children for inheritance purposes going forward, the specific
question was not addressed. See supra note 110.
129 Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Ark. 2008).
130 CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2013) (intestacy), § 21114 (class gifts).
131 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-120(11), -121 (2013) (intestacy), § 15-11-705(7)(b)
(class gifts).
132 FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2013).
133 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (2013).
134 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (2013).
135 IOWA CODE § 633.220 (2013) (intestacy), § 633.267(2) (pretermitted heirs under a
will), § 633A.3106(2) (pretermitted heirs under a trust agreement).
136 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2012).
137 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2013).
138 Woodward v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); but see supra
note 86 regarding the precedential value of Woodward.
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Michigan139

✓

Minnesota140

✓

Nebraska141

✓

✓

✓

New Hampshire142
New Jersey143

✓

New Mexico144

✓

✓
✓

New York145
North Dakota146

13:46

✓

✓
✓

South Carolina147

✓

South Dakota148

✓

✓

Virginia149

✓

✓

✓

Washington150
Total

10

12

✓
5

4

III. ADVISING CLIENTS ABOUT POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Each reader will have his or her own view of the appropriate answer to each of the questions raised above in Part II.A, as well as the
wisdom of the legal responses to date. But in our role as practitioners,
the only view that matters is that of the client before us. However, it
139 In re Cert. Ques. W.D. Mich., 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012) (Mattison v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec.).
140 MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(10) (2012) (inheritance), § 524.2-705 (incorporating the
intestate succession rules into class gifts).
141 Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Neb. 2012). A bill was introduced in 2013
to amend Nebraska’s probate code to include posthumously conceived children under
certain circumstances. See L.B. 134, 103rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013).
142 Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007).
143 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); but see
supra note 87 regarding the precedential value of Kolacy.
144 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120, -121 (2013) (intestacy), § 45-2-705 (incorporating
the intestate succession rules into class gifts).
145 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(c) (inheritance), § 5-3.2 (pretermitted
heirs); Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013 WL 3358016 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2013) adopted in rel. part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3357161, No. 10
Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (inheritance); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209
(Sur. Ct. 2007) (class members of ongoing trusts).
146 N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-19 (2013) (intestacy), § 30.1-09.1-05 (incorporating
the intestate succession rules into class gifts).
147 S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2012).
148 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2013) (intestacy), § 29A-2-705 (incorporating
the intestate succession rules into class gifts).
149 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-164 , 64.2-204 (2013).
150 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (2013) (definition of “issue” for all probate and
trust purposes).
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will be the rare client who has considered this issue deeply, if at all.
Accordingly, to ascertain the clients’ views, the lawyer must be prepared
not only to educate the clients about the relevant issues, but to ensure
they appreciate the implications of their responses. While the preceding
Parts provided the background necessary to explain to clients the issues
created by posthumous conception, this Part III articulates the specific
options to present to clients. Part IV, then, provides sample language to
carry out the clients’ decisions.
A. Introducing the Issue
Understandably, lawyers may resist raising posthumous conception
with clients. The topic is loaded not just with legal issues, but with
moral and ethical issues about which we may not know our clients’ beliefs. In addition, clients may be surprised by the topic, and they may
not immediately appreciate how it applies to them.151 Indeed, if it is not
presented to them artfully, clients may feel you are spending their time
(and money) on technical, irrelevant issues. Given these concerns, a
lawyer’s desire to address the topic may yield to velleity.
Certainly, this is not an issue to allocate much time to early in an
initial meeting, which should be spent building a rapport with the clients, identifying their assets, exploring the dispositive scheme they have
in mind, and educating them regarding any tax implications. However,
we now know the issue exists, is becoming more and more common, and
will certainly increase with each passing year. Whether at the end of the
first meeting or during a subsequent meeting, the topic should be covered before the estate plan is finalized.
When meeting with younger clients, the conversation should be
fairly easy to initiate. Given the widespread use of ART today,152 most
young couples will not feel uncomfortable if asked whether they have
used or intend to use ART. Though they may not immediately understand how it pertains to their estate planning, they are unlikely to view a
question about it as intrusive or offensive. Indeed, if they have frozen
151 Before the issues are explained to them, most clients will assume the issue simply
does not apply to them. Older clients may believe this issue applies only to younger
couples; younger couples may think it applies only to those who have frozen genetic
material; and couples of all ages may assume this pertains primarily to same-sex couples
who, other than by adoption, must rely on ART to have a child. None would be correct.
As illustrated supra in Part II.A, this conversation pertains to any client—young or old,
married or single, same-sex or heterosexual—who has (1) preserved genetic material, or
(2) is providing for grandchildren, issue, or descendants, whether outright or in trust,
vested or contingent. And while the issue is particularly relevant to same-sex couples, it
is by no means limited to them. In fact, of the fifteen published opinions to date on the
topic, none have involved a same-sex couple. See supra notes 5 & 6.
152 See supra Part I.
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sperm, eggs, or embryos, they may be among the small subset of clients
who have actually considered the issue—and if they have not considered
it, they should quickly appreciate the value in this conversation.
When meeting with older clients, the conversation may come less
naturally. As explained above, however, it still is relevant if the document they will sign provides for grandchildren or further issue. A lawyer may set the stage for this conversation as follows:
Before we wrap up, I want to quickly raise an issue that you
probably have not considered, but which has begun to cause
some unexpected problems for people’s estate plans. The issue
is posthumous conception, or the possibility that somebody in
your family could have children after their death through a
partner’s or spouse’s use of their frozen sperm, eggs, or embryos. I’m sure you’re already wondering how this applies to
you, but let me give you a real quick background about why
this may be relevant, and then you can decide whether, and if
so, how, to address it in your documents.
My own experience (and that of other attorneys I have heard from)
has been that a surprisingly large number of clients respond that they, or
a family member, have preserved genetic material. And for those clients who have not, most are nonetheless intrigued by the topic and enjoy hearing about the unique issues it has caused. An alternative to
raising the issue at a meeting is simply to pose the question on an intake
questionnaire. In either event, once you have raised the issue, you must
be prepared to explore the issue with clients as it relates specifically to
their own situation.
B. Pros and Cons of Recognizing Posthumous Conception
Once clients understand the various issues created by posthumous
conception, their first question often is how other people resolve these
issues. Initially at least, this will be a difficult question to answer, as so
few people have addressed this issue in their documents. With respect
to a client’s own posthumously conceived child (i.e., if the client has
frozen or foresees freezing genetic material), the issue simply boils down
to the clients’ intent—would they view the child as their own (or, more
accurately, under what circumstances, if any, would they view the child
as their own)?
With respect to posthumously conceived grandchildren,153 though,
the considerations are more complex, as the client may have no control
153 As used in this Article, “posthumously conceived grandchildren” refers to a
grandchild conceived after the death of that grandchild’s parent, not simply after the
death of the grandparent (which is, of course, quite common).
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over the possibility and the parent’s intent will not be expressed in the
instrument. You may start by explaining the legal approaches to date by
courts and legislatures for establishing default rules regarding posthumously conceived children. However, as explained in Part II.B above,
the approaches are essentially split down the middle. Instead, it may be
more helpful to summarize first for clients the pros and cons identified
by commentators and lawmakers of recognizing such children.
The primary advantage of recognizing posthumously conceived
children is that it respects the dignity of the child. Stated differently,
even if a client does not support the practice of posthumous conception,
recognizing the resulting child does not penalize the child who, just like
all of us, had no control over the circumstances of his or her birth.154
This view was well articulated by Judge Reginald Stanton of the New
Jersey Superior Court. Though cautioning parents to “move precipitously in this area,” the judge concluded that “once a child has come
into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled to all of
the love, respect, dignity and legal protection which that status
requires.”155
On the other hand, those who would not recognize posthumously
conceived children have expressed various concerns. Some clients may
have a fundamental objection to ART generally, or posthumous conception specifically, because it is inconsistent with their religious beliefs.156
Accordingly, they may feel they would be condoning the practice by
recognizing it in their documents. If a client expresses this fundamental
objection, our job as lawyers is to help the client articulate her belief,
not to challenge it. However, respectfully explore the client’s position a
bit further in light of the above-described advantage. Though the client
may oppose the practice itself, she may conclude after some discernment that it would be consistent with her beliefs to treat the resulting
child as the decedent’s child. If not, Part IV.B. below provides a sample
provision for such clients.
Other clients may simply have more practical concerns. For instance, they may assume that most decedents would not want assets to
154 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, prefatory note
at 1 (1988) (“Although without guile or fault, but because of the accident of birth, these
children of the new biology have been deprived of certain basic rights.”).
155 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
156 Catholicism, for instance, rejects most forms of assisted reproduction. See generally CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DONUM VITAE: INSTRUCTION
ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE AT ITS ORIGINS AND FOR THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION,
REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (1987); see also J.G. Schenker, Women’s
Reproductive Health: Monotheistic Religious Perspectives, 70 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY &
OBSTETRICS 77, 84–86 (2000); Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and
Parentage by Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2006).
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benefit children they never knew (particularly if the decedent had other
children before his death).157 Still others may fear that recognizing
posthumously conceived children could incentivize the surviving partner
to have the decedent’s child purely for financial reasons—to “get to” a
share of the assets. The most commonly expressed concern, though, is
that waiting for posthumously conceived children could delay indefinitely the administration of estates.158 While each of these concerns has
merit, these last three can be ameliorated through careful drafting, as
discussed next.
C. Walking Clients Through Their Options
Finally, the lawyer must be prepared at this point to suggest concrete options to the client and to explain the ramifications of the client’s
choices. In the pursuit of comprehensiveness, however, lawyers run the
risk of quickly overwhelming their clients with choices. Indeed, every
estate planner has seen a malaise settle over a client’s face while walking
through various options relating to trusts, such as trustee selection, the
extent of each trustee’s powers, who will be permitted beneficiaries, the
extent of mandatory or discretionary distributions, termination events,
powers of appointment, and the like. With experience, we learn to cut
to the most commonly chosen options, or, given our knowledge of the
specific client before us, the ones most likely to appeal to that client.
Though we make clear to the client that there are other options available, we do not exhaustively list each one unless the client asks us to do
so.
The creation of trusts is a scenario that most clients will have
thought a bit about and is likely, and in many cases certain, to occur.
Posthumous conception, however, is a mere possibility, and one most
clients will not have thought about. Thus, it becomes even more important to present this concisely—to think through all of the options, present those you believe will reflect the majority of your client’s wishes,
and make clear that other options are available if those you offer do not
reflect that client’s wishes. The following discusses the key issues each
157 For instance, the bill supporting New York’s statute excluding posthumously conceived children, see supra note 62, notes that the limitation prevents “children born during the testator’s lifetime [from being] unfairly deprived of their expected inheritance by
a child with whom the testator had no relationship, a possibility that in all likelihood
would have not been foreseen or desired by the testator.” NY Legis. Leg. Memo 249
(2006), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2007/02/new_
york_preter.html.
158 See, e.g., Radford & Sugarman, supra note 79, at 621 (explaining that Georgia’s
statute precluding posthumously conceived children from inheriting was intended to provide for the efficient administration of estates); 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 123 (Statement of
Purpose).
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document must address, along with what I believe will be most clients’
preferences. Specifically, these issues include (1) whether the deceased
parent’s consent should be required; (2) what effect, if any, marriage or
remarriage should have; (3) what time limitations should apply; (4)
whether the surviving partner should be required to provide the fiduciary with notice of her intent; and (5) whether to limit a fiduciary’s or
transferee’s liability. This Part III concludes by discussing important
definitions and a statement of intent to include in the will, and Part IV
then provides sample clauses that carry out these suggestions as concisely as possible.
1. Consent Requirement
The first issue the document should address is whether the decedent must have consented to his partner’s posthumous use of his genetic
material.159 Most, if not all, clients will require such consent before a
posthumously conceived child will receive assets.160 Indeed, all statutes
that recognize posthumously conceived children require such consent,
and for good reason. This requirement eliminates the concern that a
child may receive assets although the parent never intended for the child
to be considered his or her own. While minor children may have a right
to support from a living parent—whether the parent intended to have
the child or not—children do not have a right to inherit from a deceased
159 As noted in the Introduction, for readability I refer to the decedent as a male, and
I intend “partner” to include the other intended parent, whether the couple is of the
same sex, of the opposite sex, married, engaged, or simply in a committed relationship. If
a client desires to limit this class, the client is of course free to do so.
160 There is a question of whether the use of a decedent’s genetic material without
his or her consent may violate a reproductive freedom—the right not to have children
after one’s death. Knaplund, Legal Issues, supra note 40, at 409. That is a separate question from that addressed by this article, though, which is whether a parent-child relationship will be recognized for class-gift purposes once such a child has been born. Notably,
the American Medical Association’s position regarding the posthumous use of sperm is
If the donor left no instructions, it is reasonable to allow the remaining partner
to use the semen for artificial insemination but not to donate it to someone else.
However, the donor should be advised of such a policy at the time of donation
and be given an opportunity to override it.
AM. MED. ASS’N CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.04: Artificial Insemination by
Known Donor (updated Dec.1994), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physi
cian-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion204.page?. Regarding embryos, the American Medical Association states, “The gamete providers should have an
equal say in the use of their pre-embryos and, therefore, the pre-embryos should not be
available for use by either provider or changed from their frozen state without the consent of both providers.” AM. MED. ASS’N CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.141:
Frozen Pre-Embryos (updated June 1994), available at, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2141.page; See also
Knaplund, Postmortem Conception, supra note 36, at 96.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2302.txt

216

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 30

20-JAN-14

13:46

[Vol. 38:187

parent.161 The requirement also minimizes the possibility that the surviving partner could have a child simply to receive a share of the assets.162 Finally, a consent requirement minimizes concerns about a
partner retrieving sperm after the decedent’s death (or while he is incompetent) without his authorization.163 In my experience, it is this last
concern that most resonates with clients.
More specifically, the document should clarify what exactly the decedent must have consented to and the level of proof required. For instance, must the decedent have consented merely to the posthumous use
of his genetic material,164 to be treated as a parent generally,165 or specifically to recognize the child as his own for all purposes, including inheritance?166 Also, should a fiduciary require a written statement of the
decedent’s consent, or may she rely on representations from the surviving partner, other family members, or perhaps the doctor who assisted
the couple?
For clients who have frozen genetic material, these options are a bit
academic—the will should directly express the intent (and thus consent)
of the deceased parent (your client). Part IV.D. below provides language for such clients to express or decline their consent, both in the
event of incapacity and death.167
161 See Paula A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 887 (2008); Carpenter,
supra note 8, at 370-71.
162 Though conceivable, it is extremely unlikely that a surviving partner would have a
child primarily to “get to” the assets. For one, rarely would the surviving partner (who
would not be a lineal descendant) receive any assets—only the child typically would.
And, with a consent requirement, the child would only if the deceased parent consented
to the survivor’s use of the genetic material. Even if the surviving spouse or partner were
to receive assets, though, it is extremely unlikely that the survivor would choose to take
on the time, expense, energy, and responsibility of raising a child simply to receive a
share of the assets. Finally, if an estate is large enough that a client genuinely harbored
this concern, it could be addressed by specifically excluding the survivor—but not the
child—in this scenario.
163 See supra note 33 regarding postmortem sperm retrieval.
164 California, Iowa, and Louisiana take this approach. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
165 The Uniform Parentage Act takes this approach. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707
(amended 2002). For a discussion of a recent Utah case interpreting this requirement in
the context of a sperm donor agreement, see supra note 110.
166 Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Massachusetts take this
approach. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
167 Although consent for a partner to use stored genetic material in the event of the
client’s incapacity is not relevant in the context of a will, the issue would be properly
addressed in a revocable trust agreement. Consent regarding the posthumous use of
stored genetic material would properly be addressed in either a will or a revocable trust
agreement. Alternatively, consent regarding retrieval of eggs or sperm from the client’s

R
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In the grandchild context, however, whether or not a client’s child
freezes genetic material is out of the client’s control, and the intent of
the deceased parent (your client’s child) will not be stated in the will.
As a starting position, the sample clause in Part IV.C. below provides
that the decedent must merely have consented to use of his genetic material “for purposes of reproduction.” In other words, if an individual
authorized his partner to have his child, there would be an irrebuttable
presumption that he intended to recognize that child as his own. However, to distinguish this scenario from that of a sperm donor,168 such
consent must specifically refer to the decedent’s partner, not a general
consent for anyone to use his sperm. Further, the clause below does not
require that the consent be in writing. Though a writing would add certainty, such a requirement could exclude children if the deceased parent—unaware of this requirement—had not recorded his intent in
writing, even if his intent is otherwise undisputed. Notably, the 2008
Uniform Probate Code requires that the decedent’s consent be in writing169 or established by clear and convincing evidence,170 although consent will be presumed if the decedent was married at his death.171 The
sample clause below does not go that far, in part to remain as concise as
possible; however, the clause represents a starting point and is, of
course, subject to client input.
2. Marriage Options
The second issue to address is whether the decedent and his partner
must have been married at the decedent’s death. As noted above in
Part II.B, Iowa and Louisiana require that the parents were married,
while California, Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, and North Dakota
do not.172 As with consent, this issue is straightforward in the context of
a client’s own posthumously conceived children, because the document
itself will signal his intent.173 Again, in the context of grandchildren,
body would probably be most effectively addressed in a health care directive. See infra
Part IV.D
168 See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 45 (noting that the Uniform
Parentage Act, Uniform Probate Code, and American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology each recognize that a man who provides sperm
to parties other than his wife is generally deemed a “donor” and not the parent of a
resulting child).
169 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (amended 2010).
170 Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
171 Id. § 2-120(h)(2).
172 See supra note 98-99 and accompanying text.
173 This may not be true if the clients divorce but fail to revise their wills. While you
could include as an element that they be married at the decedent’s death, this concern
could be better addressed in a clause addressing posthumous use of genetic material. See
infra Part IV.D.
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however, you may need to explore the topic a bit further, because the
client cannot control whether the child’s parents will have been married.
As a starting spot, the sample clause below does not include a marriage requirement because the concern is adequately addressed by the
consent requirement. If a child expressly authorized his partner to use
his genetic material after death to have a child, I believe most clients
would honor that child’s intent to be deemed a parent of that child,
whether the child was married or not.174 Indeed, in my experience the
great majority of clients choose to recognize grandchildren born outside
of marriage as their own grandchild, as long as their child who is the
parent accepts some parental responsibilities. Further, this may be particularly important for clients with a child who is in a same-sex relationship, in which case marriage simply may not be an option in most states.
However, it applies to any single individual in a committed relationship.
Again, if a client disagrees with this approach, a marriage requirement
could be added to the clause.
Alternatively, if the surviving partner marries another individual
before the child is born, I have provided that this would cut off any
interests the child otherwise would have had. If the survivor is married
at the time he or she has the child, that child will be raised by the new
spouse, will view that individual as a parent, and likely will be supported
financially by the new spouse. This approach is analogous to an adoption, which typically severs the child’s relationship with the genetic parent for estate planning purposes.175 However, unlike adoption, the child
would only be “cut-off” if the marriage occurred before birth, but not if
the marriage occurs after the child’s birth. In other words, unless the
sample clause is revised, once the child is a member of the class, for
either outright gifts or interests in a trust, the child remains a member.
3. Time Requirement
The third essential issue is whether the posthumously conceived
child must be born within a certain period of time after the deceased
parent’s death. Almost certainly, most clients will require some period
after which the fiduciary may distribute assets to prevent hanging up the
administration indefinitely. Determining the appropriate window, however, is less straightforward. While a short window adds certainty to an
174 Indeed, this approach is consistent with most states’ intestacy laws, which generally recognize a nonmarital child as the child of both genetic parents. See, e.g., Weber v.
Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 n.2 (Minn. 1978). For example, § 2-117 of the Uniform
Probate Code now states that “a parent–child relationship exists between a child and the
child’s genetic parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-117 (amended 2010).
175 Id. § 2-119.
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estate and allows for earlier distributions, a longer time period provides
the survivor with a meaningful grieving period and opportunity to
achieve a successful pregnancy. The deadlines established in the legislative approaches to date range from two years to forty-five months.176
A shortcoming of most legislative approaches in this regard is that
they do not differentiate between classes that close as a result of the
deceased parent’s death and classes that remain open after his death.177
This distinction is critical, though. For instance, assume a will creates a
trust for grandchildren. As long as the class remains open, the administration of that trust would not be simplified by excluding posthumously
conceived grandchildren who are born more than two years after the
deceased parent’s death. Indeed, a new grandchild would simply increase the class by one, just as it would if the deceased parent was still
living. The bar would not promote a more efficient trust administration;
it would simply treat posthumously conceived children differently than
that child’s siblings and cousins. Thus, the sample clause below provides
that a posthumously conceived child will be deemed the deceased parent’s child if born within two years of the “class closing event,” rather
than by reference to the deceased parent’s death. In some cases, such as
outright interests to a child or grandchild, the class-closing event would
be the testator’s death. For ongoing trusts, though, the class-closing
event (e.g., when the youngest living grandchild turns twenty-one or
graduates from college) will often happen years after the testator’s
death.
Notably, the sample clause below also provides the fiduciary flexibility under certain circumstances to withhold or distribute assets once
the designated “deadline” passes. This approach is not found in any
statute to date, but provides some flexibility to account for the difficulties often involved with ART. For instance, assume that after a grieving
period, a surviving spouse starts actively trying to have a child using the
decedent’s genetic material, the fiduciary knows this, but the deadline
passes before the child is born. Perhaps she is still trying to achieve a
successful pregnancy,178 or perhaps she is days from delivering the child.
In either event, a strict deadline would exclude the child, while most
clients who wish to include posthumously conceived children likely
would want that child to be included, once she is ultimately born. Obvi176

See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
Only Colorado, New Mexico, and North Dakota, which have adopted the 2008
Uniform Probate Code amendments regarding posthumously conceived children, make
this distinction. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-705(7)(b) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 452-705(g) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-05(5)(b) (2013).
178 As of 2009, only thirty-one percent of IVF transfers resulted in a successful pregnancy. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
177
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ously, providing this flexibility could put a fiduciary in a difficult position. Accordingly, the clause provides the fiduciary the right—but not
an obligation—to withhold assets in that scenario until either the child is
born or the surviving partner notifies the fiduciary that she no longer
intends to use the decedent’s genetic material.
4. Notice Requirement
One state, California, provides that the person holding the genetic
material must provide notice to the fiduciary within four months of the
decedent’s death.179 This is a required element; if that person fails to
provide this notice, the later born child will have no interest in the decedent’s estate. Such a requirement appropriately shifts responsibility
from the fiduciary, who may not know the decedent had preserved genetic material, to the surviving partner. Indeed, the surviving partner is
the one person who should absolutely know whether the decedent preserved genetic material, can control whether or not the decedent will
have a posthumously conceived child, and should have the future child’s
best interests in mind. Further, because the requirement is in a statute,
the surviving partner has at least constructive knowledge of this
requirement.
However, if a strict notice requirement is put in a will or trust
agreement, the surviving partner may simply be unaware of the requirement. As a result, the later born child may be denied an interest he
would otherwise be entitled to, through no fault of the child or the surviving partner, and contrary to the deceased parent’s wishes.
In this regard, an (unborn) child should not be treated as a mere
creditor. On the other hand, a fiduciary should be entitled to assume
that a decedent did not leave preserved genetic material, unless the person with control of that material affirmatively notifies the fiduciary. To
resolve this conflict, the sample clause below provides that the surviving
partner has a duty to notify the fiduciary that the decedent preserved
genetic material and that she intends to use it for reproduction—but it
does not make such notice a condition of the child’s interest. Rather,
the concept is built into a limitation of liability provision. Under the
language below, a fiduciary is entitled to administer the trust or estate as
though no posthumously conceived children will be born—until the fiduciary receives notice otherwise. Once the fiduciary receives such notice, the fiduciary becomes obligated (assuming the above requirements
could be satisfied) to withhold a sufficient share of the assets until either
(1) the surviving partner notifies the fiduciary that she no longer intends
to use the decedent’s genetic material or (2) the time requirement set
179

CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(b) (West 2013).
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out in the document has passed (subject to the trustee’s discretion to
retain assets if the surviving partner is actively trying to have a child).
Again, this option attempts to balance fairness to the unborn child with
the practical realities of estate administration, and it allows for a level of
flexibility that is difficult to provide by general statutes.
5. Definition Section
In addition to the above provisions, a carefully worded definition
section may help avoid latent ambiguities that may arise as a result of
changing technology. Most notably, while “conception” traditionally
meant the moment that a sperm fertilized an egg, many now define conception as the moment a fertilized egg becomes implanted in the uterus.
For instance, in 2000 the editors of Stedman’s Medical Dictionary
changed its definition of conception from “fertilization of the oocyte
(ovum) by a spermatozoon to form a viable zygote”180 to “the implantation of the blastocyte in the endometrium.”181 Alternatively, a nonmedical dictionary presently defines conception as “the process of becoming pregnant involving fertilization or implantation or both.”182 Finally, Black’s Law Dictionary most recently defined conception as “the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in
human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions”
before removing the definition altogether in 1999.183 Given the conflicting definitions, would an undefined reference in a will to posthumous
conception include a child conceived through IVF, in which the egg is
fertilized while both parents are living, frozen, then implanted in the
woman’s uterus after the father dies? Should a judge assume the decedent was familiar with the most recent medical dictionary, take into account the decedent’s religious beliefs, or look elsewhere?184
Fortunately, we can define the term in our clients’ documents and
avoid such retroactive interpretation. The sample language below defines “conception” as the later of fertilization of the egg or the transfer
180

STEDMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 377 (26th ed. 1995).
STEDMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 394 (27th ed. 2000).
182 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/conception (emphasis added) (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
183 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 289 (6th ed. 1990); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 328
(9th ed. 2009).
184 The only case to address the definition of conception head-on in this context is
Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Astrue, No. 10 CV 07544, 2013 WL 3358016, at *9-12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 2013), adopted in relevant part by Bosco ex rel. B.B. v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3357161, No.
10 Civ. 7544 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013), in which a magistrate judge interpreted “conception” as used in New York’s probate statutes and held that conception occurs upon implantation of the zygote or embryo in a woman’s uterus.
181
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of the fertilized egg to the uterus for implantation.185 While certain clients may feel strongly that conception occurs at the moment of fertilization, the “later of” approach eliminates the distinction between children
conceived through IUI versus IVF and, thus, is likely to accomplish
most clients’ intent for estate planning purposes, at least.
In addition, the clause below defines “posthumously conceived children” and “genetic material.” Here, “posthumously conceived children” is not limited to those conceived (as defined in the document)
from cryopreserved genetic material. Though cryopreservation is presently the most common scenario involving posthumous conception, a
reference to cryopreservation may unintentionally exclude postmortem
sperm retrieval (in which sperm are retrieved from a man’s body shortly
after his death)186 or future technologies that may not rely on cryopreservation, such as cloning.187 Though clients may not wish to include a child conceived under those circumstances as a beneficiary,188
their concerns can be adequately addressed through the consent requirement. The definition should be broad enough to include such children, though, to avoid (to the extent possible) gaps, and thus
ambiguities, in the instrument.
Notably, because I have used the terms “genetic parent” and “genetic material” in the sample clause below, the clause would only include children who are genetically related to the decedent. In other
185 Similarly, although a number of statutes refer simply to “implantation,” this term
can be trickier than it may first appear. In one ART technique, an embryo which has
already implanted in a woman’s uterus is removed and re-implanted in another woman’s
uterus. See KINDREGAN, JR. & MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 99. Even in the context of
intercourse, implantation occurs approximately one-week after fertilization. See Fetal
Development: The First Trimester, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pre
natal-care/PR00112 (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). Thus, defining conception only by reference to implantation would mean that a child whose parents had intercourse less than
one week before the father’s death is deemed to be posthumously conceived—not likely
the intent of most people. Granted, this would be a hyper-technical interpretation that
few judges, if any, would follow. In any event, this example highlights the difficulties of
drafting in this area and the importance of being as precise—and flexible—as possible
with our language.
186 See Radford, supra note 33, at 43.
187 In addition to cloning, the next frontier of artificial insemination may include
artificial wombs, Knaplund, Postmortem Conception, supra note 36, at 99, and the creation of artificial sperm from bone marrow, Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to Parent–Child Property Succession, 62 SMU
L. REV. 367, 393 (2009) (citing Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Thinking About the Law of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 WIS. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007)). See also Kristine S.
Knaplund, Synthetic Cells, Synthetic Life, and Inheritance, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1361, 1365
(2011).
188 For instance, the California statute recognizes posthumously conceived children,
yet excludes children created through cloning. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (West 2013).

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\38-2-3\ACT2302.txt

Fall/Winter 2012]

unknown

Seq: 37

POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION

20-JAN-14

13:46

223

words, a child conceived after her father’s death would not be deemed a
child of the father if the couple had used the woman’s egg but donor
sperm to create and freeze the embryo.189 If this approach is not consistent with a client’s wishes, such children could also be included by (1)
changing the references from “genetic parent” to simply “parent” (or,
perhaps, “intended parent”), and (2) adding a clause to the end of the
definition of “genetic material” that states, “provided that if an individual had used a donor’s gametes in place of his or her own to create one
or more zygotes, blastocytes, or embryos, such zygotes, blastocytes, or
embryos shall be deemed the individual’s genetic material.”
6. Statement of Intent
Ideally, all instruments would contain tightly worded definitions
and substantive provisions that clearly express the client’s intent in
every scenario. However, ART continues to evolve, and it may not be
possible to foresee the techniques available twenty or thirty years from
now. Accordingly, despite our best efforts, gaps in our language may
arise down the road. Indeed, that is the case today with the posthumous
heirs clauses that, until recently, had worked just fine for thousands of
years. Therefore, a separate statement of the client’s intent may be useful for a number of reasons. Most importantly, it may help a future
fiduciary—or judge—to fill in those gaps, if necessary, without guessing
what the decedent’s intent might have been. In addition, such a statement may simply help a future reader put the substantive provisions in
better context if that reader has not encountered posthumous conception language in other documents. Indeed, it may even help to reorient
the client himself when he pulls out his will to review it in the future.
IV. SAMPLE PROVISIONS
The following provides three sample clauses for clients who either
(1) do not want to address the issue, (2) wish to exclude posthumously
conceived children, or (3) wish to include posthumously conceived children under the conditions discussed in Part III. Finally, for clients who
have preserved genetic material, this Part includes additional language
regarding the control of such material after their death.
189 For those states that have adopted the 2008 amendments to the Uniform Probate
Code (Colorado, New Mexico, and North Dakota), this language would override the presumption that a predeceased husband is deemed to be the child’s father, although donor
sperm was used, but only if he had consented to be treated as the parent. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2010).
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A. Approach One: Ignore the Issue
The first alternative is simply to ignore the issue. Indeed, this is
likely to be the approach found in ninety-nine percent of documents
drafted to date, as well as in the large majority of state probate statutes.
More specifically, most drafters address how to treat children born after
a parent’s death, but not children conceived after a parent’s death. The
same ambiguities and questions of intent discussed above in regard to
“afterborn heirs” statutes will apply to clauses such as this, as well.
2.1. Posthumous Children. The members of any class described in this instrument shall include any child born alive
who was [conceived before but born after][born within nine
months after][in gestation at the time of] the death of the
child’s father, unless the child becomes a member of that class
only by reason of adoption after birth.
B. Approach Two: Exclude All Posthumously Conceived Children
The second approach is simply to exclude all posthumously conceived children. This approach may be appropriate for clients fundamentally opposed to, or simply uncomfortable with, posthumous
conception. As explained above, though, other concerns clients may
have about posthumous conception can be adequately addressed
through drafting.
2.1. Posthumously Born and Posthumously Conceived Children. A child who is born after the death of a parent shall not
be deemed a child of that parent for any purposes under this
will, unless the child was in gestation at the time of the parent’s
death and born alive within ten months after that parent’s
death.
C. Approach Three: Include Posthumously Conceived Children
The following language is for those clients who wish to include
posthumously conceived children, subject to the conditions discussed in
Part III above. The provisions refer to genetic material broadly so that
they could apply to a male or female client without altering the language. However, for specific references to individuals, the language below assumes the client is a married male. These references must be
changed if drafting a will for both spouses or for a client who is unmarried or in a same-sex relationship. Similarly, all references to “will”
should be changed to “agreement” if the language appears in a trust
agreement.
2.1. Posthumously Conceived Children. The following provisions shall apply for purposes of this will:
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2.1(a). Statement of Intent. I intend for any child conceived with the help of assisted reproductive technology
after the death of a genetic parent to be treated as a child
of the deceased parent, subject to those conditions I have
established in Paragraph 2.1(b). I recognize that assisted
reproductive technology is evolving, and the language I
have used may not accurately capture all scenarios possible at or after my death. To the extent that the language
is vague, creates an ambiguity, or fails to cover a specific
situation, the will should be construed liberally to grant
interests to posthumously conceived children.
2.1(b). Conditions. A posthumously conceived child
shall be considered the child of the deceased parent, but
only if (1) the deceased parent had consented [in writing]
to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material by
the surviving partner for purposes of reproduction (either directly or through a surrogate), (2) the surviving
partner is not married at the time of the child’s birth, and
(3) with respect to any class of which the child would be a
member under this will, the child is born on or before the
[second] anniversary of the class-closing event. Any
child who meets these requirements shall be deemed to
have been living immediately before the class-closing
event.
2.1(c). Exception For Fiduciary Discretion. If a child
would meet the first two requirements of Paragraph
2.1(b) and, at the time of the deadline established above,
the fiduciary has actual knowledge that the surviving
partner is attempting to or otherwise intends to have a
child (or children) using the deceased parent’s genetic
material, the fiduciary may, but shall not be required to,
retain for that child (or children) a share of the assets as
though the child (or children) was born before the
deadline.
2.1(d). Limitation of Liability. No fiduciary shall be liable for distributions that the fiduciary should have made
to or set aside for a posthumously conceived child pursuant to Paragraph 2.1(b) if the fiduciary did not have actual notice at the time of the distribution that the
decedent had preserved genetic material. Once the fiduciary receives such notice, however, the fiduciary shall set
aside an appropriate share of my estate or the affected
trust until the deadline provided under Paragraph 2.1(b)
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has expired (subject to the fiduciary’s discretion under
Paragraph 2.1(c) to retain assets) or the surviving partner
states in a writing to the fiduciary that he or she does not
intend to use the preserved genetic material for reproduction. No transferee shall be liable for or have any obligation to refund distributions received from a fiduciary
that the fiduciary should have made to or set aside for a
posthumously conceived child pursuant to Paragraph
2.1(b).
2.1(e). Definitions. For purposes of this will, a “posthumously conceived child” shall mean a child conceived
through the use of assisted reproductive technology after
the death of one or both of the child’s genetic parents
and born alive. Conception shall be deemed to occur
upon the fertilization of an egg inside a woman’s body;
provided that if fertilization occurs outside of the body or
a fertilized egg is removed from a woman’s body, conception shall be deemed to occur when the fertilized egg (as
a zygote or at any later stage in its development) is transferred to a woman’s body for implantation in her uterus.
“Genetic material” shall include any cell, part of a cell, or
group of cells that includes any part of the individual’s
genome and which may be used for reproductive purposes, including without limitation a gamete, zygote,
blastocyte, or embryo.
D. Control of Genetic Material
If a client has frozen (or intends to freeze) genetic material, the will
should include a statement clarifying his or her intentions regarding that
material after death and, if the instrument is a revocable trust agreement, during any period of incapacity. Indeed, the first posthumousconception-type cases did not regard the interests of the children, but
the surviving partner’s right to the decedent’s genetic material.190 While
the law is still evolving regarding the characterization of genetic material as personal property or some other form of property,191 a clear
statement of the decedent’s intent may be critical if an ownership or
190 See Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1349 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (involving a contest between a decedent’s parent and his girlfriend regarding the
disposition of his preserved sperm); Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (involving a contest between a decedent’s girlfriend and children regarding the disposition of his preserved sperm, which he had devised to his girlfriend in his
will).
191 See Kindregan, Jr., supra note 33, at 153-56.
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intent dispute arises. Care should be taken to ensure that this language
is consistent with any other statement your client may have made in
forms provided by his or her fertility clinic, in a health care directive, or
in any other document.
3.1 Statement Regarding Ownership and Control Of My Genetic Material. I have frozen genetic material that is presently
being stored for my later potential use. Following are my instructions regarding the ownership and control of such genetic
material in the event of my incapacity or death:
3.1(a). If I am Incompetent. During any period that I
am incompetent, I authorize my wife in her sole discretion to use my genetic material for reproduction, to donate my genetic material for scientific research, or to
destroy my genetic material.
3.1(b). After My Death. If I predecease my wife, my
genetic material shall be controlled exclusively by, and
shall be released to and used by, my wife in her sole discretion. If I survive my wife, or to the extent my wife has
not taken control of any genetic material in storage [two
years] from the date of my death, such genetic material
shall be donated for scientific research, if possible, or if
not, then destroyed. Any interests that a child born from
such genetic material may have under this instrument,
however, shall be subject to Paragraph 2.1.
Consistent with the foregoing, any person having possession of
or control over my genetic material shall release the material
to my wife upon her request or otherwise accept directions
from my wife regarding the genetic material.
Finally, individuals who have preserved genetic material should
consider adding language to a Power of Attorney (or creating a separate
Power of Attorney) to provide a partner with specific authority to make
decisions regarding the storage and transfer of the principal’s genetic
material, and to initiate, consent to, and pay for ART procedures, during any period of incapacity. Similarly, individuals may also consider
adding language to a Health Care Directive to consent to the retrieval
and subsequent use of their gametes during a period of incapacity and, if
appropriate, posthumously.192
192 Provisions in a will would be ineffective in either case. The will would simply be
ineffective during the individual’s incapacity, and it would not likely be probated within
the timeframe required to retrieve the gametes after the individual’s death. While a revocable trust agreement would in theory be effective in either case, medical providers
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CONCLUSION
Posthumous conception has received increasing attention over the
past few years as it has evolved from science fiction to established practice. Numerous courts, including most recently the United States Supreme Court, have now confronted issues created by posthumously
conceived children, sixteen states have passed legislation expressly addressing the interests of posthumously conceived children, and over one
hundred applications for Social Security survivor benefits have been
filed on behalf of posthumously conceived children. Notwithstanding
this trend, few estate planning lawyers discuss the possibility of posthumous conception with their clients. As more couples turn to assisted
reproduction for help conceiving children, however, the odds increase
that a client’s estate plan may be affected by a child or grandchild not
just born, but conceived, after the death of a parent. Rather than ignoring this possibility and leaving the result to chance (or litigation), lawyers have the opportunity—if not the responsibility—to raise the issue
with their clients and provide them the opportunity to express their intentions. Moreover, the conversation provides an opportunity to reinforce to clients the complexity of estate planning and the expertise and
value you bring. Ultimately, whether to address the issue in an instrument is the client’s choice, but she cannot make this choice if she is not
made aware of the issue. With this Article, estate planning lawyers have
the basic technical and legal background necessary to explore the topic
with clients, an outline of key issues to address, and proposed language
regarding posthumous conception to include in a will, trust agreement,
or other governing instrument.

would likely be more familiar with and comfortable following instructions in a health care
directive.

